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In this paper I delineate novel policy repercussions yielded by my research on "The New Economics of the Brain Drain." In section 1 I provide a succinct account of the model that inspires the derivation of new policy implications. In sections 2 through 5 I present the policy implications.
The benchmark model of Stark and Wang (2002)
Consider a small open economy without migration. The economy produces a single good, the price of which is normalized at 1. The large number of identical workers is a constant N. The Workers borrow the requisite funds to support the human capital formation at a zero rate of interest.
Since labor is the only production input, the gross earnings per worker are simply equal to output per worker, that is:
The coefficients α and η measure the private returns and the social returns of human capital, respectively. The objective of a worker is to maximize his net earnings, that is, his gross earnings minus the cost of forming human capital:
, the worker's chosen level of human capital is:
From the assumption that there are N identical workers in the economy it follows that the average level of human capital in the economy is also * θ . Therefore, the net earnings per worker are:
The following lemma will be helpful in subsequent analysis.
Proof: Consider the function 1 ( ) ln( ). By substituting x k α = and applying the Lemma, it can be easily seen that ( *) 0 W θ > .
However, since the social returns to human capital are not internalized by the individual worker, * θ is not the socially optimal level of human capital. Only when the externalities that accrue from the economy-wide average level of human capital are taken into account, are the net earnings per worker socially maximized. To do so, we consider the function:
The social planner optimizes by choosing the level of θ that brings (5) to a maximum. Since
, the socially optimal level of human capital is:
Clearly, since 0 η > , ** * θ θ > . If a worker were to choose to form this level of human capital, his net earnings would be:
Since ( ) individual worker perceives the economy-wide average level of human capital only as a parameter that cannot be affected by his decisions; in a large economy, no individual can dent the average level of human capital. Thus, the prevailing level of human capital will be * θ . Stark and Wang (2002) next introduce the possibility of a governmental intervention aimed at bringing the private optimal level of human capital to coincide with the social optimal level of human capital. They show that a strictly positive probability of migration to a technologically advanced destination country in which the returns to human capital are higher than in the home country increases the optimal level of human capital that individuals elect to acquire. The underlying idea is that higher expected returns to human capital away from home create an incentive to acquire more human capital at home. In the wake of the human capital adjustment process, an individual either ends up as a higher skilled migrant worker in the technologically advanced country F, or he stays as a higher skilled worker in the home country, H. Country F's production technology is given by ˆ( ) ln( 1) f C θ β θ = + + , where β α η > + and 0 C ≥ are constant and exogenous to the model. Workers in H obtain the Fcountry gross earnings with probability 0 p > . With probability 1 p − they work in H with whatever human capital that they elected to form, obtaining gross earnings as per (1). The (risk neutral) worker's expected gross earnings are therefore 
and the revised optimal level of human capital is then ( ) Stark and Wang (2002) show that by setting * p p = where
and 0 * 1 p < < , the government forges a "golden" result: * ** θ θ = ; individuals are lead out of their own accord to form the socially optimal level of human capital. Stark and Wang (2002) then show that when * p p = , 0 * 1 p < < , the level of wellbeing of all the individuals, both the ones who left and the ones who stay behind with more human capital that they would have formed in the absence of the migration prospect, is strictly higher than when 0 p = .
With this summary account of the basic model in place, I will now turn to a presentation of several examples, based on the average, of the model's policy fallout.
2. When and how can migration to a country substitute for educational subsidies in that country?
2.1 From Stark and Wang (2002) we know that individuals form human capital that falls short of the socially optimal level of human capital. Assuming that all the individuals in a country are identical, this human capital formation must entail an average level of human capital that is lower than the socially optimal average level of human capital. By lowering, via educational subsidies, the cost of acquiring human capital, the human capital formed will be increased, that is, the average level of human capital will be raised. This is obvious. , it follows that migration raises the average level of human capital if the migrants are better educated than the natives, thereby reducing the need to resort to educational subsidies.
2.2 A simple average tale thus illustrates how migration, by boosting the average level of human capital in the receiving country, can reduce its need to resort to educational subsidies.
The arrival of skilled migrant workers can crowd out subsidies aimed at inducing skill acquisition by native workers.
Who should be admitted when the receiving country cares about the wellbeing of the unskilled workers who stay behind in the sending country?
3.1 Let labor be the only production input in the home country H. Let the output, hence the gross earnings, of any worker in H be an increasing function both of the worker's own skill level and of the economy-wide average skill level. Let there be two types of workers: lowability unskilled workers, and high-ability skilled workers. Let the fractions of the two types θ θ < (recalling (13)), the new average skill level is lower and every H country worker who stays behind will therefore be worse off.
In a static framework, a D country that cares about the wellbeing of the unskilled workers who stay behind at H, if faced with a choice of either admitting unskilled workers from H or skilled workers from H, will thus want to admit unskilled workers from H. number, however small: instead of studying, say, three years of engineering, the high-ability workers study a little bit more than four. Then, not only will the unskilled who stay behind gain from the migration of the skilled, they will gain more than they would have gained if such that, as a consequence, while those whose skill level is θ do not acquire any additional human capital, the high-ability workers now acquire 6 2 ε + + units of human capital: instead of studying, say, six semesters of engineering, the high-ability workers now study a little bit more than eight. The new average level of human capital of the migrants (like that of those who stay behind at H), will be 2 2 (6 2 ) 5 5 2
Thus, D benefits, the unskilled workers who stay behind benefit (since 2 5 4 ε + > ), and the skilled workers who migrate benefit (assuming that they expose their 6 2 ε + + units of human capital to a better paid environment at D). If the skilled workers who stay behind are also better off, then everyone is better off.
Note that raising the probability of migration from 1 4 to 1 2 entails a doubling of the numbers of both skilled and unskilled migrants.
4.3 A lesson to be drawn from this back-of-the-envelope exercise is that the dynamic consequences of a migration policy could lead to a policy that appears somewhat paradoxical: in order to overcome the adverse repercussions of the presence of unskilled workers in the incoming migration flow, more unskilled workers have to be admitted. migrate. There is, though, no apparent reason not to impose a higher tax on the skilled; indeed, they will still come even if the tax is as high as 70 ε − . Thus, D will seek happily to levy this higher entry tax, filling its coffers with the maximal tax revenue. However, such a policy ignores the effect of the tax on the very incentive to acquire skills: when faced with relatively low earnings in D, the high-ability workers in H will elect to acquire only a correspondingly low skill level, their productivity will be lower, and they will receive lower pay -say 80. But then, if it is desirable for D to have skilled workers from H coming in, 70 ε − will not be feasible (incentive compatible).
5.2 This example illustrates why the choice of an entry tax aimed at separating the skilled from the unskilled cannot be independent of the response of the skilled to the incentive to acquire skills which, in turn, is affected by the level of the tax. Put differently, the choice of the level of a migration entry tax by D cannot be de-linked from the human capital formation calculus at H.
